On 24 November 2022, Anwar Ibrahim was sworn in as Malaysia’s Prime Minister (PM) following intense negotiations after the election held on 19 November 2022. His appointment marked a significant political development, as he successfully garnered majority support from elected parliamentarians across various parties, including those outside his coalition.
Two years after the 2022 elections, a significant concern for Anwar’s “unity” government and Malaysia’s electoral integrity is that the ruling coalition may dissolve by the withdrawal of support from one or several component political parties. The absence of robust measures that prevent parties – rather than just individual MPs – from shifting their political support from one coalition to another during a legislative period risks government collapse.
While an Anti-Party Hopping Law was introduced in 2022 to prevent individual MPs from changing parties, it does not extend these requirements to entire parties. This gap in the legislation could potentially trigger a change in government without the need for new elections.
The failure to entrench electoral safeguards and prevent such political manoeuvring is paving the way in Malaysia for the formation of even larger political coalitions to ensure that party hopping would not lead to a government change. However, large coalitions can undermine the essence of multi-party elections and the political will expressed by the electorate in the polls. This is the risk to electoral integrity Malaysia will face in the run-up to the next general elections.
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The Subversion of the Government Elected in 2018
Party or coalition defections are strategies periodically observed in Malaysian politics, where politicians switch their loyalty from one party or camp to another. This practice often serves to secure their position and influence within the political landscape, particularly in times of instability or when seeking to maintain power.[1] At the state level, party defections or “hoppings” have led to the downfall of eight governments.[2] In contrast, at the national level, while politicians frequently switched parties, causing changes in coalition composition and victory margins across various elections,[3] party hopping never successfully challenged the government led by the Alliance Party coalition and its successor, the Barisan Nasional coalition, since the general election in 1955.
However, this changed in 2020 with the party-hopping “Sheraton Move”,[4] which occurred two years after the GE2018 election – which resulted in the defeat of the UMNO-led BN coalition. This “Move” triggered two years of political instability, during which prime ministers changed and component parties that made up the government altered without citizens being called to the polls.
In the run-up to the GE2018, the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition – the main opposition to the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition – gained support from former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who left UMNO to join the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (BERSATU).[5] PH, which included BERSATU, achieved victory over UMNO and the BN coalition, winning 113 out of 222 seats in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) for a narrow majority.[6] A key condition for the coalition to form the government was the understanding that Mahathir would assume the premiership but would transfer power to Anwar Ibrahim of the People’s Justice Party (PKR), the leading party in PH, after two years.[7]
Two years after the election, when Prime Minister Mahathir was due to hand over the premiership to Anwar, the coalition struggled to agree on a succession plan due to Mahathir’s reluctance to step down.[8] Concurrently, BERSATU faced internal divisions, with some members opposing Mahathir’s leadership, the alliance with PH, and the succession plan for Anwar. Instead, they advocated for forming a new coalition with the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and other smaller parties.[9] These developments ultimately led to BERSATU leaving PH to establish the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition in February 2020.[10]
The “party hopping” that led to the formation of the PN coalition, since dubbed the Sheraton Move, marked the first successful toppling of the government at a national level. Member parties sidelined both Mahathir and Anwar to support Muhyiddin Yassin from BERSATU as prime minister. The PN coalition also received backing from the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, which had been in opposition since the election.[11]
Despite the realignment, the governing coalition maintained only a narrow parliamentary majority.[12] By mid-2021, tensions within the coalition escalated as UMNO, dissatisfied with the leadership arrangement and the handling of COVID-19 policies, withdrew its support for PM Muhyiddin. This crisis of confidence ultimately led to Muhyiddin’s resignation in August 2021, marking the second change in government since the 2018 election.[13]
Anti-Party Hopping Electoral Reform
The “Sheraton Move”, which resulted in the establishment of the PN, and the subsequent political instability during the premierships of Muhyiddin Yassin and Ismail Sabri Yaakob highlighted the risks associated with shifting loyalties among MPs and political parties within a coalition, leading to three prime ministers in four years. It also demonstrated how defections could undermine party loyalty and betray voters’ original intentions.
The ongoing prospect of political instability prompted parliamentarians to implement a series of electoral reforms just before the General Election 2022 (GE2022). Among these reforms was the Constitution (Amendment) (No. 3) Act 2022,[14] commonly known as the Anti-Party Hopping Law (AHL), which aimed to prevent elected representatives from switching political parties during their term. The AHL imposes penalties on MPs who resign from their party and join another. In such cases, their seat is vacated, triggering a by-election that allows voters to decide whether to continue supporting the MP or choose a replacement. Additionally, the amendment protects MPs’ seats if they are expelled by their party leaders, allowing them to retain their seats and join a different party.
The Anti-Party Hopping Law (AHL) was promoted as a means to restore citizens’ political trust after years of political turmoil. It aims to dissuade elected representatives from changing their political stances and party loyalty once they are in parliament. This initiative is particularly focused on countering money politics and corruption, which are suspected to be significant factors driving such defections, thereby upholding electoral integrity.[15]
However, the AHL does not apply at the coalition level, allowing political parties to join and change coalitions without facing any repercussions. Consequently, while the “Sheraton Move” was used as a justification for the law, it would not have prevented such an occurrence, as the move involved a party-level shift in support rather than individual MPs simply “hopping” parties. Instead, it fails to prevent party leaders from making political decisions unilaterally to shift loyalties or coalitions without needing to secure the agreement of their elected members.[16]
Without a mechanism to guard against defections and shifting loyalties, the threat of political backstabbing remains a significant concern for the Anwar government, which secured victory in the General Election 2022 (GE2022).
Threats to the Anwar Unity Government
Although the PKR-led Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition secured victory in the General Election 2022 (GE2022), the majority of the vote share was spread among the three major coalitions – PH, Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN) – resulting in no coalition commanding a majority in Parliament. After several rounds of intense negotiations, a compromise was reached among PH, BN and the Sarawak-based Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) to form an Anwar-led “unity” government.[17] This negotiation was historic, as PH and BN had long been fierce political competitors.
However, two years on in late 2024, signs of internal fractures began to emerge within Anwar’s administration. The limited protections offered by the AHL against another “Sheraton”-type move have brought the issue to the fore for several reasons.
First, there exists a pervasive atmosphere of mistrust, which has given rise to numerous rumours and speculations on social media regarding potential hoppings. The PH-BN governing coalition has faced attacks from PAS, the leading party in the PN coalition, openly calling for the toppling of the government as early as 2023.[18] Additionally, in January 2023, there were rumours surrounding the ousting of UMNO President Ahmad Zahid Hamidi to destabilise the PH-BN coalition and potentially dismantling the unity government; this was referred to as the “London Move”.[19]
In early 2024, speculation about a “Dubai Move” began to circulate. This move entailed enticing certain MPs to break ranks from the PH-BN unity coalition and support the PN-nominated prime ministerial contender.[20] Since this strategy did not require MPs to change parties, those approached to support the PN would not face penalties under AHL. This situation would also apply if the PN successfully courted the support of an entire party.
Although the two “moves” ultimately did not materialise, they nonetheless highlight a troubling trend in Malaysia’s political landscape where the expectation of betrayal has become a prevalent concern.
Second, conflicts among parties within the government over policies related to race, religion, and royalty may lead to MPs or parties shifting their support away from the governing coalition, potentially resulting in its downfall. Anwar’s administration faces internal dissent from UMNO leaders and MPs[21] who advocate for Malay interests and struggle to reconcile their partnership with the Democratic Action Party (DAP).[22] The DAP is perceived as primarily representing Chinese-Malaysian interests and aiming to challenge the dominant narratives surrounding race, religion, and royalty in Malaysian politics. This tension is further exacerbated by PAS, which has gained traction among Malay voters, criticising Anwar for allegedly catering to DAP demands while neglecting issues pertinent to Islam and the Malay community.[23]
As signs of a potential political crisis loom and to sustain his political dominance, the Anwar government has begun discussions on amending and strengthening AHL to prevent coalition members from bringing down the government by shifting loyalties. Various proposals have resurfaced from the initial discussions that led to the 2022 amendment. The PKR has suggested introducing a “recall remedy” that would empower voters to take action against elected representatives who switch party affiliations or otherwise fail to fulfil their obligations.[24] The party has also advocated for stricter measures[25] including a requirement for MPs expelled from their parties to vacate their seats.
While the government have indicated their readiness to table an amendment to AHL,[26] the path forward remains uncertain, requiring a majority vote in Parliament.
Hence, Anwar has gone beyond seeking support for amending AHL. Instead, he has been actively shoring up support from various parties within and beyond his PH coalition in anticipation of the upcoming general elections, scheduled for no later than November 2027.
This strategy includes seeking endorsements from BERSATU members to undermine the party’s standing as an opposition force,[27] while simultaneously aiming to maintain future cooperations with UMNO.[28] Anwar has also engaged with traditional political structures on the Borneo island. In response to accusations regarding his ability to adequately represent Malay-Muslim interests, he is exploring avenues for gaining support from PAS, the party that leads a significant bloc of Malay-Muslim voters, to bolster the government’s position.[29]
Should Anwar succeed in compromising and sharing power among these competing interests, the next election could yield a stronger and more stable government that is less susceptible to being toppled.
Conclusion
This is where Malaysian politics stands two years following the 2022 general elections:
Unable to put into place a robust anti-party hopping law, Anwar’s efforts in the second half of his administration will be focused on establishing an all-encompassing governing regime that would give him stability as the country turns towards the next general elections.
However, this success may come at a significant cost to multi-party democracy in Malaysia. The formation of the unity PH-BN government under Anwar has already faced criticism for betraying the progressive and democratically-aligned political positions that previously characterised the opposition.[30]
Consequently, this approach risks diluting genuine opposition voices within Malaysian politics, thereby significantly compromising the quality of multi-party democracy in the country.
Lina Sakina Salim, Asia Centre
Notes
[1] Hershan @ Ray Herman, Muhammad Izwan Ikhsan and Ku Mohd Amir Aizat Ku Yusof (2023) ‘Navigating Party Loyalty and Party Hopping in Malaysia Through Nordin Salleh and Khaliq Mehtab’s Cases’, Malaysian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 8(10): 1–10, at: https://doi.org/10.47405/mjssh.v8i10.257.
[2] Shad Saleem Faruqi (2024) ‘Loopholes in Malaysia’s anti-defection law’, Fulcrum, at: https://fulcrum.sg/loopholes-in-malaysias-anti-defection-law.
[3] Ibid.
[4] The name “Sheraton Move” refers to the agreement made at Sheraton Hotel in the city of Petaling Jaya, Selangor to form the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition.
[5] Wan Saiful Wan Jan (2020) Why Did BERSATU Leave Pakatan Harapan?, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
[6] Inter-parliamentary Union (2018) ‘Malaysia: Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives)’, Inter-parliamentary Union, at: http://archive.ipu.org/parline/reports/2197_e.htm.
[7] The Straits Times (2018) ‘PM Mahathir says he will honour agreement to hand power to Anwar after two years’, The Straits Time, at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/pm-mahathir-says-he-will-honour-agreement-to-hand-power-to-anwar-after-two-years.
[8] Sophie Lemière (2020) ‘The never-ending political game of Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad’, Brookings Institute, at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-never-ending-political-game-of-malaysias-mahathir-mohamad.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Mohd Irwan Syazli Saidin (2023) ‘Malaysia’s Crisis of Political Legitimacy: Understanding the 2020 Power Transition and “Sheraton Move” Polemics Through the “Eyes” of Malaysian Political Science Graduates, Cogent Social Sciences, 9:1, 2222572, at: DOI: 10.1080/23311886.2023.2222572.
[11] Sophie Lemière (2021) ‘Is Muhyiddin unstoppable?’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/muhyiddin-unstoppable.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ayman Falak Medina (2021) ‘Malaysian Prime Minister resigns, deepening political crisis’, ASEAN Briefing, at: https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/malaysian-prime-minister-resigns-deepening-political-crisis.
[14] “DR 15/2022 Constitution (Amendment) (No.3) Bill 2022” (2022), Democratic Action Party, at: https://dapmalaysia.org/repository/DR15%202022_Amendment%20in%20Committee%20Constitutional%20Amendment%20Anti%20Hopping%20Law_ENG.pdf.
[15] Shad Saleem Faruqi (2024) ‘Commentary: Loopholes in Malaysia’s anti-defection law’.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Amir Yusof and Najmi Syahiran Mamat (2022) ‘Anwar to lead unity government comprising PH, BN and GPS; keeps door open for other partners’, Channel News Asia, at: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-ge15-anwar-ibrahim-pm-press-conference-unity-government-vote-confidence-3098681.
[18] Channel News Asia (2023) ‘PAS chief’s remarks on toppling Anwar government stirs controversy, police probe under way’, Channel News Asia, at: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-pas-abdul-hadi-topple-government-investigation-police-controversy-3339351.
[19] Faiz Zainudin (2023) ‘Ismail denies involvement in plot to oust Zahid’, Free Malaysia Today, at: https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2023/01/04/ismail-denies-involvement-in-plot-to-oust-zahid; Aqil Haziq Mahmud (2024) ‘Malaysia gripped in wave of denials, accusations over alleged “Dubai Move” plot to topple Anwar govt’, Channel News Asia, at: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-dubai-move-anwar-topple-government-4025001.
[20] James Chai (2024) ‘Commentary: Malaysia’s “Dubai Move” was doomed to fail – it misunderstood Sarawak’s GPS coalition’, Channel News Asia, at: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/malaysia-dubai-move-topple-anwar-sarawak-borneo-4073746.
[21] MalaysiaNow (2024) ‘Two-thirds majority, but Anwar’s coalition is a house of cards, says Mahathir’, MalaysiaNow, at: https://www.malaysianow.com/news/2024/09/25/two-thirds-majority-but-anwars-coalition-is-a-house-of-cards-says-mahathir.
[22] Tajuddin Rasdi (2024) ‘Is there a political “sandiwara” between Umno and DAP?’, Free Malaysia Today, at: https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2024/10/18/is-there-a-political-sandiwara-between-umno-and-dap.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Bernama (2024) ‘Amendment to anti-party hopping law requires thorough bipartisan discussion, agreement – Azalina’, Bernama, at: https://bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2317809.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Azril Annuar (2024) ‘PM Anwar makes play for PAS support to woo Malaysia’s Malay majority’, The Straits Times, at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/pm-anwar-makes-play-for-pas-support-to-boost-backing-from-malaysia-s-malay-majority,
[28] Lu Wei Hoong (2024) ‘UMNO chief Zahid wants alliance with PM Anwar to continue, but some dream big after by-election win’, The Straits Times, at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/umno-chief-zahid-wants-continued-alliance-with-pm-anwar-but-some-dream-big-after-by-election-win.
[29] Annuar (2024) ‘PM Anwar makes play for PAS support’.
[30] Han Jun Lim (2024) ‘Why Malaysian voters and civil society are turning on Anwar Ibrahim’, East Asia Forum, at: https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/08/28/why-malaysian-voters-and-civil-society-are-turning-on-anwar-ibrahim.