Dismantling Myanmar’s Election Integrity: A Post-Coup Review

On 1 February 2021, the Burmese military – the Tatmadaw – staged a coup d’etat, seizing political control of the country, justifying its actions by alleging widespread fraud in the November 2020 general elections. ¹ In the said elections, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) secured a landslide victory, winning 920 (or 82%) of the total 1,117 elected seats, while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) managed only 71 seats or 6.4% of elected seats. ²

After the coup, the Tatmadaw declared a State of Emergency (SoE) for an initial period of one year. ³ When this period ended in February 2022, the SoE was extended six times, each for six months, continuing this pattern until 31 July 2024. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing self-appointed himself as the Prime Minister of Myanmar on 1 August 2021, six months after the military coup, marking the formation of a caretaker government under him. ⁴ He then took over as the acting president on 22 July 2024 and extended the SoE until 31 January 2025. ⁵ The Tatmadaw justified these SoE extensions on the claims that the ongoing unrest and instability posed too great a risk to hold elections. ⁶

Although Min Aung Hlaing, as the SAC’s Chair, had pledged to hold multi-party elections following the coup, ⁷ the SAC has used the SoE extensions to systematically dismantle the pre-coup multi-party electoral framework that had been positively evolving since 2003.

The developments following the 2021 coup represent the Tatmadaw’s attempt to claw back power from the democratic reforms that dissipated its influence. ⁸ This process of clawing back power has involved re-establishing control over the country’s electoral framework, to undermine the role of pro-democracy forces, allowing the Tatmadaw to consolidate its authority by manipulating legal frameworks, suppressing dissent, and marginalising opposition parties.

Myanmar’s Roadmap to Democracy

In 2003, Myanmar’s military introduced a new political reform vision termed the “Roadmap to Discipline-flourishing Democracy.” This seven-step process ⁹ aimed to enhance the regime’s legitimacy domestically and internationally after decades of stringent military rule. ¹⁰ The roadmap outlined a gradual approach to establishing a democratic governance structure, beginning with reconvening the National Convention to set constitutional principles. This process would then progress to drafting a new constitution and ultimately holding free and fair elections.

The UN ¹¹ raised concerns that the military’s seven-step roadmap lacked participation and transparency, as it excluded key political parties and stakeholders from the process. Despite these criticisms, the Tatmadaw proceeded with the roadmap and implemented the 2008 Constitution, which effectively entrenched its power. ¹² This constitution allocated 25% of parliamentary seats to unelected military representatives, securing the military a veto over constitutional amendments, ensuring it retained a dominant role in governance despite nominal democratic reforms. ¹³

In November 2010, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Myanmar’s military government, organised general elections, but they faced a boycott from the NLD and several other pro-democracy parties. These groups cited the SPDC’s failure to meet essential conditions for a free and fair election, such as reducing military power entrenched by the 2008 Constitution, which granted the Tatmadaw significant control over the parliament. They also demanded international election monitoring and the release of all political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, as prerequisites for participation. ¹⁴

Due to the lack of guarantees for free and fair elections, the NLD and other pro-democracy parties withdrew from the electoral process and the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won 129 out of the 224 seats in the 2010 elections, which were held under widespread allegations of irregularities. ¹⁵ Despite these allegations, Myanmar had a nominally civilian government from 2011, setting the stage for the 2015 elections.

Electoral Developments Post-2010 General Elections

The 2010 general elections were interpreted by the international community as the fifth of the seven-step junta roadmap towards a disciplined democracy, with the convening of elected representatives and building a modern, developed and democratic nation under disciplined democracy, as the sixth and seventh. ¹⁶

The electoral framework was amended by Myanmar’s military-backed civilian government, led by General Thein Sein, heading the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), to allow competitive electoral participation. ¹⁷ The changes improved inclusivity through a new voter registration process and increased opportunities for political party registration, including enhancing transparency by granting the Union Election Commission (UEC) more provisions to enforce stricter regulations on political campaign financing. ¹⁸

As a result, the NLD was able to revive and revitalise itself, setting up party branches nationwide and expanding its networks and memberships throughout the country. In the 2012 by-elections, held to fill 46 vacant seats in the parliament (out of a total of 664 seats) and 2 local parliament seats in Bago/Pegu and Ayeryarwady/Irrawaddy regions, the NLD won all of them but two, including the NLD Chair – Aung San Suu Kyi, winning a seat in the lower house. ¹⁹

With the growth in popularity of the NLD and the changes in the electoral system, the 2015 elections were seen as a duel between the NLD and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) – an ultranationalist, pro-military political party. ²⁰ Further, Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity among the people drove diverse ethnic groups to vote for the NLD. These factors help explain how, in 2015, the NLD won the election with 135 Upper House seats and 255 Lower House seats, despite the military holding substantial power. ²¹

The 2015 elections marked a crucial turning point in Myanmar’s democratic transition. ²² Avery Davis-Roberts (2017) Myanmar: 2015 General Elections Final Election Report, The Carter Center, at: https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/myanmar-2015-final.pdf.[/ref] Additionally, workshops at municipal and national levels aimed to enhance electoral management and establish effective dispute-resolution mechanisms. ²³ Additionally, workshops at municipal and national levels aimed to enhance electoral management and establish effective dispute-resolution mechanisms. ²⁴

These reforms, along with Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity, economic growth, and ethnic conflicts, enabled the NLD to secure 396 out of 476 seats in the 2020 general election, while the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party won 35 seats. ²⁵

Post-Coup Electoral Legislation Developments (2021-2024)

Following the 2021 coup, the military sought to restructure the electoral landscape by undermining the role of political opposition, contributing to the erosion of multiparty democracy in the country and consolidating its control, particularly following the 2015 and 2020 election results.

In March 2021, following the imposition of Martial Law through Orders 1/2021, ²⁶2/2021, ²⁷ and 3/2021 ²⁸ the junta established “special courts or military tribunals” that transferred executive and judicial power to regional army commanders under Article 419 of the 2008 Constitution. These courts aimed to enforce security and expedite trials for political party representatives and activists arrested after the coup. Operating under military control, they often result in swift convictions without adequate legal representation. ²⁹

In May 2021, U Thein Soe – chairman of the junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC), publicly called for the dissolution and abolishment of the National League for Democracy (NLD), accusing it of plotting illegal activities to win the 2020 elections (The Irrawaddy, May 2021). By July 2021, the junta-controlled UEC annulled the 2020 election results, claiming fraud and irregularities by the NLD. ³⁰ Furthermore, intimidation against NLD members escalated, with office raids, ³¹ arrests ³² and killing of members. ³³

In November 2021, the military junta charged top NLD leaders with electoral fraud, ³⁴ targeted election officials appointed by the disposed NLD-led government, arresting and charging the former chairman of UEC ³⁵ along with more than 100 election commissioners ³⁶ under election fraud charges. By July 2022, it had charged and fined over 2,400 UEC members over several charges relating to the 2020 election. ³⁷

In this context, the junta initiated administrative and legal changes to further dismantle the electoral progress and the 2020 results. At least three changes must be noted.

First, a shift from the first-past-the-post (FPTP) to proportional representation (PR) was been proposed by military leaders and pro-military parties. ³⁸ This has been a consistent talking point of the junta following the coup in 2021. PR is seen as a strategy to weaken opposition parties by diluting their ability to gain a majority, even if they receive the most votes in a state. This system, combined with a politically biased redistricting and a lack of independent oversight mechanism, could ensure that military-backed parties retain influence in future elections. ³⁹ Redrawing larger districts might concentrate or dilute voter demographics, further skewing seat allocation to favour the regime. ⁴⁰

Second, in January 2023, Myanmar’s junta enacted the Political Party Registration Law, ⁴¹ replacing the 2010 legislation. The law was amended in January 2024 by the SAC, known as State Administration Council Law No 15/2024, ⁴² further tightening the registration and operation of political parties. The new law includes provisions aimed at weakening opposition parties and hindering their ability to contest elections. Notably, it bars anyone convicted of a crime or serving a prison sentence from joining a political party, a clause that disqualifies many prominent opposition figures. Among those affected are Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint of NLD, both convicted on politically motivated charges following the 2021 coup. Suu Kyi was found guilty of corruption, violating COVID-19 restrictions, and breaching the Official Secrets Act, while Win Myint was convicted of terrorism-related offences. ⁴³

The Law also imposed strict registration requirements, giving political parties only 60 days to register with election authorities to avoid dissolution. By the deadline, 40 political parties were dissolved, including NLD, which opted not to register. ⁴⁴ Tun Myint, secretary of the Yangon region executive committee for the NLD, confirmed the party’s refusal, citing the illegitimacy of the election bodies established by the military council. ⁴⁵ Additionally, the law disqualifies any political party designated as a terrorist organisation. This includes the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), which has been actively resisting the junta and was officially labelled a terrorist group by the regime in September 2021, ⁴⁶ effectively barring it from participating in the political process.

Third, holding staggered elections is another strategy employed by the military to ensure its political power. ⁴⁷ Staggered elections involve contesting only a portion of legislative seats at any given time. ⁴⁸ This approach arises from the junta’s struggle to maintain control over territories held by ethnic armed groups and resistance forces, rendering nationwide elections impractical. ⁴⁹ It is expected to distribute seats more evenly and benefit the military and its allied parties, enabling them to secure more seats than under the previous system. ⁵⁰These developments have undermined the roadmap established by the SAC to restore stability and governance post-coup, which emphasises peace, political dialogue, economic recovery, national reconciliation, and eventual elections. ⁵¹

By excluding or limiting opposition participation, particularly that of the NLD, and manipulating electoral rules, the junta ensures that only its representatives have a genuine chance of winning seats. ⁵² The introduction of proportional representation and the absence of key opposition groups further solidified the dominance of pro-military factions in parliament. ⁵³ However, this apparent political stability is not guaranteed; it may instead escalate conflict, as resistance forces and ethnic groups continue to reject the junta’s rule. ⁵⁴

Conclusion

Since the 2021 coup, one of the primary strategies of Myanmar’s military has been to project its efforts to address alleged voting fraud from the 2020 General Elections to the ASEAN region and the international community. They have attempted to gain legitimacy through legal and administrative measures by re-holding elections. However, the events that have unfolded since the coup highlight a troubling trend: the junta is systematically dismantling democratic gains, suppressing opposition, and undermining international electoral standards. This includes manipulating the legal framework governing elections, undermining criteria for free and fair elections, and restricting independent election observations. As a result, the military is setting up an electoral system devoid of integrity, enabling them to assert “legitimacy” either directly or indirectly through a proxy political party, thereby consolidating their control over the country.

Sanjay Gathia, Asia Centre