On 20 October 2024, Prabowo Subianto was sworn in as Indonesia’s eighth president, after securing more than 58% of the votes in the February 2024 presidential election.[1] The significance of the election lies in how political coalitions that have metamorphosed into cartels are leading Indonesia down the path of a weakened opposition to an “opposition-less democracy”.
These coalitions, often pragmatic rather than ideological, and driven by power-sharing agreements among political elites, have over the years been expanding into cartels to capture power.[2] The net outcome of this approach is that it ignores the initial motivation to democratise Indonesia’s electoral system and install independent checks and balances. Instead, it entrenches patronage networks and diminishes electoral competitiveness.
While coalitions can facilitate governance, their metamorphosis into cartels undermines electoral integrity in several ways. By fostering collaboration among major parties instead of competition, they lead to predetermined election outcomes.[3] In Indonesia, elite interests are often prioritised over genuine democratic processes, resulting in policy stagnation and a weakened electoral framework that hinders reform and meaningful political change.[4] Abetting an incestuous political cycle, it is not unusual in Indonesia that competing candidates, once their presidential term is over, later endorse their competitors.
The transformation of electoral coalitions into cartels poses substantial challenges to the quality of multi-party elections, limiting opportunities for diverse candidates and concentrating political power within elite families. In particular, it homogenises political platforms and disenfranchises voters from having representatives who would champion alternative viewpoints and act as independent checks and balances.
Evolution Towards Direct Presidential Elections
Indonesia began its transition to democracy in 1998 following the resignation of the then President and dictator Suharto.
A key point to note is that before the democratic reforms, presidents were selected by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), serving as the Legislature. The MPR in Suharto’s period included elected members from three “sanctioned” political parties and appointed members from the armed forces and regional representatives.
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (BJ Habibie), who served as Suharto’s vice president, became president following Suharto’s resignation in 1998. As President, Habibie initiated key reforms aimed at political openness and decentralisation. Of note, he facilitated the Law on Political Parties in 1999,[5] increasing the number of political parties, which had been limited to three under Suharto’s rule.
While BJ Habibie opted not to run in the 1999 presidential election – partly due to pressure from his own party[6] – the election itself represented a remarkable transition towards multi-party democracy. Under the new Political Parties Law, 48 parties contested to elect members of the People’s Representative Council (DPR)[7], which is the lower house of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR).
Megawati Sukarnoputri, the eldest daughter of Indonesia’s first president Sukarno, led the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) to win the most votes but did not secure a majority. This led to extensive jockeying in the legislature, with Golkar, the former ruling party, forming a coalition called the “Central Axis” to block her presidential bid. As a result, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur)[8] became president, with Megawati as vice president. This strategy of blocking a competitor established a pattern in Indonesian politics where parties prioritised power-sharing alliances over ideological commitments to democracy.
Gus Dur was the first president to be freely elected by the Indonesian parliament, serving a two-year term. Under his presidency, the Legislature instituted several pro-democracy reforms that recognised the autonomous status of Indonesian regions and introduced direct elections for regional leaders. It also curbed the rule-making powers of the president and barred the office from dissolving the parliament.[9] Overall, he enjoyed a strong majority in the parliament, reflected by his “National Unity Cabinet”, which, towards the end of his presidency, included parties that represented 436 out of 462 elected members in DPR.[10]
However, Gus Dur’s popularity declined due to due to accusations of mismanaging government funds and was impeached on 23 July 2001.[11] The impeachment was also spurred on by a lack of relationship-building and power-sharing between the governing parties, particularly, from his attempts to consolidate power that alienated key political partners.[12]
Following this, the MPR elected Megawati Sukarnoputri as the president. From 2001 to 2004, with the assurances from coalition partners that she would not be impeached, Megawati broadly endorsed the same parties that had supported Gus Dur. The Cabinet under her was dubbed the “Mutual Assistance Cabinet”.[13] Under her term, an additional set of political reforms was passed,[14] including a mechanism for the direct election of the president and vice president. The quota in the MPR for the armed forces and other appointed representatives was also removed.[15]
The same issue that plagued Gus Dur’s coalition – insufficient compromise and power-sharing between parties – fostered animosity towards Megawati and the PDI-P. This discontent contributed to the Democratic Party’s nomination of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly known as SBY) to contest in the 2004 elections which was the first direct presidential election.[16]
The Entrenched Cartelisation of Elections
In 2004, SBY, a retired general from the Democratic Party won the presidential elections. Following his victory, President SBY established the United Indonesia Cabinet (Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu), featuring a similarly broad coalition as seen under the previous three presidents. The SBY Cabinet was composed of parties that represented 403 seats out of 560.[17]
Following the fallout with Megawati, the PDI-P emerged as the first major opposition party in legislative politics. However, the notion of an “opposition” would gradually be diluted in subsequent elections. For instance, the cabinet’s composition, dominated by established parties like Golkar, National Mandate Party (PAN), and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), limited the effective role of the opposition, notably excluding the PDI-P from substantial influence. This reduced voters’ alternatives outside the ruling coalition, curbing meaningful political competition and limiting space for smaller parties to challenge the coalition’s influence.
In the elections that followed, the trend was similar. In the 2009 election, incumbent President SBY and his Democratic Party again won the elections. Although his party didn’t secure an outright majority, it gained the most seats, prompting the formation of SBY’s second cabinet – largely consisting of the same parties. PDI-P was still in the opposition, together with the Gerindra party which was formed just before the election to contest SBY. SBY’s second cabinet – “Second United Indonesia Cabinet” saw his coalition representing 342 seats in DPR.[18] This coalition strategy enabled President SBY to consolidate his position for a second term. It reinforced the trend of Indonesian parties prioritising pragmatic alliances to share power and maintain governance while continuing to weaken the political opposition.
Following two unsuccessful attempts to challenge SBY in subsequent elections, Megawati shifted her focus to a kingmaker role by supporting her party’s popular candidate, Joko Widodo (commonly known as Jokowi) in the 2014 election. Jokowi defeated Gerindra’s Prabowo Subianto, son-in-law of former president Suharto, to become the president.[19]
Following the election, Jokowi faced challenges in forming a governing coalition due to a fragmented parliamentary landscape. However, Jokowi and PDI-P courted a range of mid-to-small-sized parties, leaving out SBY’s Democratic Party, Gerindra and Golkar, which gained a major bulk of the seats. Later using the instrument of cabinet reshuffles, Jokowi was able to include Golkar and exclude the non-cooperative National Mandate Party (PAN). By the end of Jokowi’s first term, his “Working Cabinet” represented 386 out of 560 DPR seats.[20] Once again, this represented a strategy to keep opposition elements and influence at bay.
The 2019 Indonesian elections resulted in a continuation of President Jokowi’s administration. This election was marked by a significant number of contesting parties, with 16 parties participating in the presidential race and over 200 in the legislative elections.[21] Following the elections, a complex web of coalitions emerged. Jokowi’s big-tent “Onward Indonesia Cabinet” included nearly all major parties for a majority coalition of 525 out of 575 DPR seats by the time his second term ended[22], once again keeping the opposition numbers small. Of note, in his second term, he was able to co-opt opposition parties such as Prabowo’s Gerindra – despite being Jokowi’s chief presidential challenger in the 2014 and 2019 elections – through the promise of political power-sharing.[23] Jokowi appointed Prabowo the position of Defense Minister following the formation of Jokowi’s second administration team.[24] In the final days of his administration, Jokowi replaced two ministers that he deemed were disloyal to him and president-elect-Prabowo.[25]
Overall, President Jokowi’s two terms as president were marked by the decline of opposition voices in politics. The cartelisation approach to secure dominance in the legislature comes at the cost of weakening and marginalising the opposition. By prioritising legislature control to pass laws to secure policy implementation while diluting the opposition’s ability to act as an effective checks and balances, the essence of a multi-party democracy is lost.[26]
The 2024 Election and Prabowo’s Presidency
After two unsuccessful attempts, Prabowo secured Indonesia’s presidency in the 2024 election, winning 58% of the votes, succeeding Jokowi, who was ineligible to run again due to term limits.
The 2024 election was an instance where a competitor became an endorser. After being able to position his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as vice-presidential candidate, President Jokowi leveraged the weight of his office to support Prabowo’s campaign, which played a pivotal role in his victory.
However, Prabowo’s victory is perceived as a departure from the democratic aspirations that emerged following the post-1998 reforms. The election reflects a broader trend of political consolidation, where powerful figures can shape electoral outcomes through strategic alliances. As of October 2024, President Prabowo has courted all political parties represented in DPR except for the Megawati-led PDI-P, National Democrats (NasDem) and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) via his “Red and White Cabinet”.[27] This means President Prabowo has a majority of 348 out of 580 elected seats in DPR.[28] Nonetheless, Prabowo offered PDI-P to join his political coalition.[29] Despite declining to join, PDI-P agreed to support the government’s upcoming annual budget motion.[30] Similarly, while they did not join, both NasDem and PKS also expressed “full support” for the Prabowo administration.[31]
This effectively has rendered Indonesia an “opposition-less democracy”.
These developments signal a deep erosion of democratic governance. Unless challenged, Prabowo’s administration is poised to usher in a period where political pluralism is weakened, and accountability is diminished, especially if the opposition is effectively sidelined in the legislative process. The ongoing shifts suggest that future political competition in Indonesia may become increasingly constrained, with strategic alliances effectively preventing independent checks and balances.
Conclusion
In Indonesia, the evolution of political coalitions into cartels has diluted meaningful political competition, creating momentum for a weakened opposition to transition into an “opposition-less democracy”.
In an electoral democracy, the formation of political coalitions and alliances is a common practice that enables different parties – typically aligned by certain ideological affinities – to cooperate and achieve shared goals. However, since the early 2000s, political coalitions in Indonesia have often been formed between parties that previously engaged in intense competition.
These alliances, which can be described as political cartels, centre around post-election power-sharing arrangements designed to allocate state power and resources across a diverse array of opposing parties, frequently lacking a cohesive political strategy or alignment.[32] Similar to economic cartels, these alliances function to consolidate control and reduce competition.
In a political landscape with no effective opposition, there are increasing threats that new laws and regulations will be enacted to stifle those who want to hold the government publicly accountable. At risk will be politicians, civil society actors and journalists, raising concerns about the future of democratic engagement and accountability in Indonesia.[33] As Prabowo’s administration takes over the government’s reins, the potential for a more repressive environment looms, challenging the prospects for meaningful political reform and citizen participation.
Kartini Sunityo, Asia Centre
NOTES
[1] The Jakarta Post (2024) ‘BREAKING: KPU confirms Prabowo’s landslide win’, The Jakarta Post, at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/03/20/breaking-kpu-confirms-prabowos-landslide-win.html.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Burhanuddin Muhtadi (2022) ‘Indonesia’s Cabinet reshuffle: Rewarding loyalty and consolidating power’, Fulcrum, at: https://fulcrum.sg/indonesias-cabinet-reshuffle-rewarding-loyalty-and-consolidating-power.
[4] Thomas Pepinsky (2024) ‘Indonesia’s election reveals its democratic challenges’, Brookings Institute, at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indonesias-election-reveals-its-democratic-challenges.
[5] “Law of Republic of Indonesia No.2 of the Year 1999 Concerning Political Parties” (1999), in Collection of Electoral Laws, Jakarta, Indonesia: National Election Commission, 1–20, at: https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/ID/Indonesia%20Electoral%20Law%201999.pdf.
[6] Taipei Times (1999) ‘Habibie’s speech doesn’t go over well with assembly’, Taipei Times, at: https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/1999/10/16/0000006629; Geoff Spencer (1999) ‘Indonesia’s Habibie withdraws’, AP News via Way Back Machine, at: https://web.archive.org/web/20201129140803/https://apnews.com/article/219ba3630e874ce89b1f270942cd9f56
[7] National Democratic Institute (1999) ‘The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-election Developments in Indonesia: A Post-Election Assessment Report’, The Cater Center, at: https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/indonesia-mission-1999.pdf.
[8] Gus Dur was an important member of the Reformasi movement and founder of the moderate Islamic party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) or the National Awakening Party.
[9] Ari Welianto (2020) ‘Amandemen UUD 1945: Tujuan dan Perubahannya [Amendment to the 1945 Constitution: Aims and Changes]’, Kompas, at: https://www.kompas.com/skola/read/2020/02/06/140000869/amandemen-uud-1945-tujuan-dan-perubahannya?page=all.
[10] Yuri Sato et al. (eds.) (2000) ‘Appendix’, in Indonesia Entering a New Era, Spot Survey No. 17, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation, at: https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Reports/Spot/17.html; R. William Liddle (2001) ‘Indonesia in 2000: A Shaky Start for Democracy’, Asian Survey 41(1): 208 – 220, at: https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/14218780.PDF;
[11] Kornelius Purba (2021) ‘Impeaching Gus Dur, a blind but visionary president’, The Jakarta Post, at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2021/07/29/impeaching-gus-dur-a-blind-but-visionary-president.html
[12] Irman G. Lanti (2002) ‘Indonesia: The Year of Continuing Turbulence’, Southeast Asian Affairs: 111–129, at:https://www.jstor.org/stable/27913204.
[13] Dan Slater (2018) ‘Party Cartelisation, Indonesian-style: Presidential Power-sharing and the Contingency of Democratic Opposition’, Journal of East Asian Studies 18(1): 23–46, at: doi:10.1017/jea.2017.26.
[14] Iswara N. Raditya (2020) ‘Amandemen UUD 1945 Tahun 2002: Sejarah Isi & Perubahan Keempat [Amendment to the 1945 Constitution of 2002: History & Fourth Amendment]’, Tirto.id, at: https://tirto.id/amandemen-uud-1945-tahun-2002-sejarah-isi-perubahan-keempat-ejLE.
[15] VOA News (2009) ‘Indonesia agrees to remove police, army parliamentary seats – 2002-08-14’, VOA News, at: https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2002-08-14-31-indonesia-67435947/384410.html.
[16] Alan Sipress (2004) ‘President head for defeat in Indonesia vote’, Washington Press, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/09/21/president-heads-for-defeat-in-indonesia-vote/0fff35f9-fbd0-4675-9b5a-0cbbf8d55eb9.
[17] Willy Wahyu Astuti (2024) ‘The President’s Prerogative Rights in Appointing Ministers in the Presidential Government System After the Amendment to the 1945 Constitution’, International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding 11(6): 129–140, at: https://ijmmu.com/index.php/ijmmu/article/view/5813.
[18] Andreas Ufen (2010) ‘The Legislative and Presidential Elections in Indonesia in 2009’, Electoral Studies 29(2): 281–285, at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.02.003; Willy Wahyu Astuti (2024) ‘The President’s Prerogative Rights in Appointing Ministers’.
[19] KPU (2014) ‘Hasil Penghitungan Perolehan Suara dari Setiap Provinsi dan Luar Negeri dalam Pemilu Presiden dan Wakil Presiden Tahun 2014 diisi Berdasarkan Formulir Model DC PPWP dan Sertifikat Luar Neger [Vote Counting Results from each Province and Overseas in the 2014 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections Filled in Based on the Model DC PPWP Forms and Overseas Certificates]’, KPU, at: https://www.kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/PPWP_-_Nasional_Rekapitulasi_2014_-_New_-_Final_2014_07_22.pdf.
[20] Sigit Joyowardono (2014) ‘Buku Data dan Infografik Pemilu Anggota DPR RI & DPD RI 2014 [Data Book and Infographics for the 2014 DPR RI & DPD RI Elections]’, Jakarta, Indonesia: KPU; McLarty Associates (2019) ‘McLarty Indonesia Update: Jokowi announces new Cabinet’, McLarty Associates, at: https://maglobal.com/jokowi-new-cabinet; Francis Chan (2018) ‘Indonesian president Jokowi reshuffles Cabinet, appoints Golkar sec-gen, former military chief’, The Straits Times, at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-president-jokowi-reshuffles-cabinet-appoints-golkar-sec-gen-and-former.
[21] Ben Bland (2019) ‘Politics in Indonesia: Resilient elections, defective democracy’, Lowy Institute, at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/politics-indonesia-resilient-elections-defective-democracy; Muhammad Bahrul Ulum (2020) ‘Indonesian Democracy and Political Parties Afte Twenty Years of Reformation: A Contextual Analysis’, Indonesia Law Review 10(1), at: DOI: 10.15742/ilrev.v10n1.577.
[22] James Massola (2019) ‘From enemies to allies in six short months: Jokowi to invite Prabowo into cabinet’, The Sydney Morning Herald, at: https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/from-enemies-to-allies-in-six-short-months-jokowi-to-invite-prabowo-into-cabinet-20191022-p532vf.html; Metro TV (2024) ‘Membaca maksud Jokowi tarik Demokrat ke Kabinet’, Metro TV, at: https://www.metrotvnews.com/play/NgxCVrRG-membaca-maksud-jokowi-tarik-demokrat-ke-kabinet.
[23] Muhtadi (2022) ‘Indonesia’s Cabinet reshuffle’.
[24] Marchio Irfan Gorbiano (2019) ‘Jokowi officially asks Gerindra to join new Cabinet: Prabowo’, The Jakarta Post, at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/21/gerindras-prabowo-ready-to-contribute-to-jokowis-cabinet.html; Aljazeera (2019) ‘Indonesia’s Widodo appoints archrival as defence minister’, Aljazeera, at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/23/indonesias-widodo-appoints-archrival-as-defence-minister.
[25] The Nation Thailand (2024) ‘President Jokowi removes PDI-P ministers in reshuffle two months before exit’, The Nation Thailand, at: https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40040722.
[26] Bland (2019) ‘Politics in Indonesia’.
[27] Kennedy Muslim and Burhanuddin Muhtadi (2024) ‘President Prabowo’s politics of accommodation might mean a short honeymoon’, Fulcrum, at: https://fulcrum.sg/president-prabowos-politics-of-accommodation-might-mean-a-short-honeymoon.
[28] KPU (2024) ‘Decision of KPU No. 1043 of 2024’, KPU, at: https://jdih.kpu.go.id/data/data_kepkpu/2024kpt1043.pdf.
[29] Stanley Widianto (2024) ‘Prabowo gets support from PDI-P, but no coalition deal yet’, The Jakarta Post, at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/10/17/prabowo-gets-support-from-pdi-p-but-no-coalition-deal-yet.html.
[30] Yustinus Patris Paat (2024) ‘Don’t be so quick to judge: PDI-P on Prabowo’s giant cabinet’, JakartaGlobe.id, at: https://jakartaglobe.id/news/dont-be-so-quick-to-judge-pdip-on-prabowos-giant-cabinet.
[31] Wiji Nur Hayat (2024) ‘NasDem pilih tak masuk ke Kabinet Prabowo, ini alasan lengkapnya [NasDem chose not to enter Prabowo’s Cabinet, this is the complete reason]’, CNBC Indonesia, at: https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20241014141220-4-579419/nasdem-pilih-tak-masuk-ke-kabinet-prabowo-ini-alasan-lengkapnya; PKS (2024) ‘PKS sampaikan dukungan penuh kepada Presiden terpilih Prabowo Subianto [PKS conveys its full support to President-elect Prabowo Subianto]’, PKS, at: https://pks.id/content/pks-sampaikan-dukungan-penuh-kepada-presiden-terpilih-prabowo-subianto.
[32] Lestari (2016) ‘Cartel Party’.
[33] Aljazeera (2024) ‘Protests across Indonesia as parliament delays change to election law’, Aljazeera, at: https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/8/22/protests-across-indonesia-as-parliament-delays-change-to-election-law.