Thailand’s economy has suffered a staggering 60 billion baht loss in 2024 due to widespread online fraud, with millions of citizens falling victim to sophisticated telephone and SMS scams. The Royal Thai Police (RTP) reported well over 400,000 online fraud cases in the first quarter of 2024, accounting for losses upwards of contributing to a staggering $1.89 billion loss.[1] Similarly, a 2025 Global Anti-Scam Alliance (GASA) report found that 72 percent of Thai adults surveyed had encountered scam attempts, with 60 percent scammed in the past 12 months and 14 percent losing at an average of $408 per person.[2]
With the weight of these significant financial losses in mind, then-Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra launched a large-scale crackdown on scam centers operating along the Thai border with Myanmar in Tak Province. 7,000 people were rescued from illegal call centers operating in Myanmar, one of three countries along with Cambodia and Laos as safe havens for criminal syndicates operating multiple scam operations.[3] Crackdowns also later contributed to the repatriation of more than 80 Indonesians and 94 Chinese nationals.[4] Scam operations have ensnared thousands of people dating back several years, with victims from Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Vietnam prompting responses from their respective governments.[5] Yet for all of the posturing and domestic politics of law and order, little of substance has been accomplished in the latest frontier of non-traditional security threats to Thailand and the surrounding region. This brief article analyzes the state of non-traditional security in the context of online scams both in Thailand and across its borders into neighboring Myanmar and Cambodia. The crux of the forthcoming analysis is that lacking major rule of law improvements and traditional security progress in broader Southeast Asia, Thai citizens and many foreign nationals will continue to be victimized by agile criminal networks.
Resistance is not Futile
When Paetongtarn took over Pheu Thai Party for the ousted Srettha Thavisin in 2024, combating cybercrime, fraud, and transnational crime was one of the ten policy priorities and a cornerstone of the government’s agenda,[6] When a Chinese model and actor was taken from Thai territory into neighboring Myanmar[7], pressure from panicked more than 10,000 Chinese nationals[8], who frantically cancelled their New Year holidays to Thailand prompted another policy review, including draft amendments to Thailand’s Cybersecurity Act of 2019[9] as well as enhanced monitoring of digital platforms and consumer protection under the Kingdom’s Digital Platform Service Law of 2022.[10] Paetongtarn was eager to improve communications with neighbors, affirming cooperation and a joint commitment to tackling online fraud.[11] To alleviate fears at home, Chinese state media immediately began noting the difference in the number of fraud cases after power was cut off to areas of Myanmar were compounds were located, reporting that the number of cybercrime cases in Thailand decreased by 20 percent since February 5, or a span of roughly five weeks.[12] Soon after, Thailand made some changes to its Royal Decree on Measures for the Prevention and Suppression of Technology Crimes, with additional obligations for banks and criminal charges for misuse of personal data. It also attempts to create compensation for those victimized.[13]
However, these legislative efforts have little hope of curbing the enormity of the problem. Offenders are often nameless, faceless members of criminal enterprises operating well beyond the reach of the law. Criminal gangs still operate in a the mostly lawless Myawaddy region of Myanmar, despite the crackdown earlier in 2025. A 2023 report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) found at least 120,000 trafficked people across Myanmar and 100,000 in Cambodia could still be held and forced to execute lucrative online scams.[14] At the time, People’s Party MP Rangsiman Rome estimated that the number of scammers in Myanmar was around 300,000, working in 40 major compounds.[15] The combined nature of the scamming enterprise, where criminal syndicates traffic or lure foreign nationals with the false promise of a lucrative job in the region makes exploitation more common than prosecution. During the raids, many of the people trapped were convinced they were on their way to a career in information technology (IT), engineering, customer service and many of the scams were a complicated mix of cryptocurrency fraud, social media shopping scams, as well as multiple forms of deception on WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook.[16] One account from a Guardian (UK) story documented the plight of a 26-year-old Kenyan man who flew from Nairobi to Bangkok for a customer service job, borrowing from friends to pay a recruitment fee of more than $1,500, but ended up in a walled compound in Myanmar, with his passport seized by militia.[17] Thailand’s scam problems are compounded by notoriously weak borders and corrupt law enforcement. When Cambodia, with whom hostilities are at a fever pitch are taken into account, joint cooperation is not only far less likely, but becomes fodder for nationalist sentiment. It is well known that Cambodian elites have been tied to illicit operations across multiple sectors, evident by coordinated activity between political and economic figures and mainland Chinese, some of whom have been implicated in scam operations.[18] While Myanmar is in a far worse predicament due to the collapse of its rule of law, what remained of law enforcement has been decimated by strikes and abandonment for resistance groups.[19] Thus, the key to combatting the scam crisis in Thailand depends ultimately on a more cooperative approach.
The Lack of a Regional Approach
The lack of effectiveness of Thai authorities to curb the human trafficking and scam epidemic also prompted alarm at the UN in March 2025, where the Special Rapporteurs on Contemporary Forms of Slavery and on Trafficking in Persons, Tomoya Obokata and Siobhán Mullally asked the Thai Government for details on issues such as bilateral or multilateral measures to prevent and address human trafficking, victim identification, consular training, repatriation support, regional responses and public protection.[20] Thailand was not the only country to receive letters like this, as Cambodia and Myanmar were among eight countries to whom letters were sent. One of the concerns, bilateral and multilateral measures, is emblematic of how difficult the problem is to solve without a region-wide approach. ASEAN, for example, has two functioning mechanisms, the Framework on Personal Data Protection and the Framework on Digital Data Governance, which were put into place in 2016 and 2018 respectively. However, personal data protection from country to country is lacking.
By contrast, Denmark has some of the most robust personal data protection laws in the world, where in June 2025 it passed a law that changed copyright laws to ensure that all citizen have the right to their own body, including facial features and voice.[21] The purpose was to set a standard for Europe to adapt to the potential for additional fraud and other scams created by AI-generated deepfakes, which are realistic digital representations of a person, which encompasses their appearance and voice. ASEAN countries, for example, have varying degrees of quality. Thailand’s latest edition, according to the Personal Data Protection Committee (PDPC), imposes a harsh penalty for violations of individual data for criminal activity of up to a year in prison or a fine of 100,000 baht.[22] Singapore leads the list of nine ASEAN countries with more advanced protections and an emerging partnership with the European Union (EU) to enhance data protection, especially for children as both parties value the reciprocal economic benefits, evidenced by Singapore’s ranking of fifth largest partner for services for the EU.[23]
However, the best practices within ASEAN have limited effect because of the lack of sincerity in regional cooperation. It was only in mid-September 2025 after a 10-hour negotiation with Cambodia in Sa Kaeo Province, which sits along their shared border, that a breakthrough in intelligence sharing was reached.[24] Sa Kaeo was the location of a visit by Paetongtarn in June, as scam activity in neighboring Poi Pet caused concern.[25] While both Thailand and Cambodia have been quick to promote crackdown efforts along their borders, the phenomenon of “show crackdowns” are commonplace in Phnom Penh, which serve to insulate and support the industry of human trafficking and organized cybercrime[26], where some estimate suggests that revenue generated could exceed $19 billion per year or as much as 60 percent of Cambodia’s GDP.[27]
Luck in the Form of Delay
While conflict with Cambodia and an evolving landscape in Myanmar might slow progress in curbing the scamming crisis, Thailand may have caught a small, break as political instability, evidenced by a shakeup in both the Cabinet and a new Prime Minister, have potentially stalled efforts to build integrated resorts, which are synonymous with legalized casino gaming. Casino legislation, pushed by the former ruling Pheu Thai Party (PTP) to boost economic growth and build upon Thailand’s “soft power”[28], seem interrupted during the transfer of power to new PM Anutin Charnvirakul. The Bhumjaithai leader in June 2025, blamed Paetongtarn’s casino legislation for the drop in Chinese tourism arrivals, warning that the populist policy could warrant consequences from Chinese President Xi Jinping.[29] In his criticism, Anutin suggested that the primary beneficiary has been Chinese nationals engaged in “grey businesses” and political elites with close ties to the government.[30]
While politically charged, there is some validity to this argument, as the influx of “grey” capital, where the interplay of legal business mixes with the institutions of the state to form a parasitic and kleptocratic alignment. As mentioned earlier in Cambodia, Thailand has faced a problem of its own, evidenced by the 2022 case of Chaiyuth Chirawatworakul or “Tu Hao”, although charges against him for money laundering and drug offenses were later dropped.[31] In February 2025, two Royal Thai Police (RTP) generals were transferred (but not prosecuted) for their connections to casinos and grey businesses in Myanmar, Police Maj. Gen. Aekkarat Intasueb, Commander of the Inspection Division and Pol Maj. Gen. Samrith Emkamol, Commander of Police in Tak Province.[32]
More importantly, at the present time, Thailand lacks the necessary institutional strength and independence to handle the potential violations associated with a large casino presence, a task that Singapore, whom Thailand had attempted to both model and compete with, has had some difficulty in curtailing money laundering, evidenced by compliance breaches in a August 2023 criminal case involving a scam operation with ties to offshore gaming in the Philippines.[33] The presence of integrated resorts, including casinos, also can attract elements of criminality, as demonstrated in numerous places in Southeast Asia, East Asia, and in the United States. With legislation halted under Anutin, an opportunity to model institutions in the best practices of ASEAN and among regional partners like the EU are in Thailand’s best interests.
Thailand’s vulnerability to scams, which continue to disrupt the lives of Thai nationals (regardless of economic status), remains despite large-scale and well-publicized crackdown efforts. As previously mentioned, the prolonged conflict with Cambodia which has consumed lives along their shared borders will continue to test the extent of their commitment to resolving an equally problematic issue for their respective populations. Cambodia, like Thailand has trumpeted their own successes, such as a July 2025 crackdown where the newly-established Committee to Combat Internet Fraud claimed that 58 fraud centers were destroyed and more than 3,000 suspects–mostly those from other parts of Southeast Asia—including 693 Vietnamese, 366 Indonesians, and 82 Thais—were arrested. These crackdowns, which are part and parcel in retaining public legitimacy in the face of growing criminality, merely scratch the surface of what is possible and probable in an underregulated and volatile region rife with systemic corruption.
Mark S. Cogan
Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, Kansai Gaidai University, Japan
Notes –
[1] “Online Fraud Cost Thailand 60 Billion Baht in 2024, Report Reveals.” (2025, April 2). The Nation. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40048240.
[2] “Thailand Faces ₿115.3B Scam Crisis – GASA 2025 Report.” (2025, August 5). Global Anti-Scam Alliance. https://www.gasa.org/post/thailand-faces-unprecedented-scam-crisis-with-thb-115-3-billion-lost-annually.
[3] Goldstein, L. (2025, February 19). “Thousands rescued from illegal scam compounds in Myanmar as Thailand launches huge crackdown.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/19/myanmar-scam-call-centre-compound-rescues-thailand-crackdown.
[4] Myanmar Transfers 94 Chinese Scammers to China via Thailand. (2025, August 20). https://www.khaosodenglish.com/news/2025/08/20/myanmar-transfers-94-chinese-scammers-to-china-via-thailand/
[5] Davidson, H., & Lin, C. (2022, August 23). “Hundreds of Taiwanese trafficked to Cambodia and held captive by telecom scam gangs.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/23/hundreds-of-taiwanese-trafficked-to-cambodia-and-held-captive-by-telecom-scam-gangs.
[6] Policy Statement of the Council of Ministers, Delivered by Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra to the National Assembly, September 14, 2024.
[7] “Thai Police to Return 10 Chinese Suspects Linked to Actor’s Abduction.” (2025, February 14). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thai-police-return-10-chinese-suspects-linked-actors-abduction-2025-02-14/.
[8] Rungjirajittranon, M., & Lai, S. (2025, January 29). “Chinese Tourists Fear Kidnappings by Scam Centres in Thailand.” Hong Kong Free Press HKFP. https://hongkongfp.com/2025/01/29/chinese-tourists-fear-kidnappings-by-scam-centres-in-thailand/.
[9] “Thailand Releases Draft Cybersecurity Law Amendments for Public Consultation.” (2025, August 1). MLex. https://www.mlex.com/mlex/articles/2372091/thailand-releases-draft-cybersecurity-law-amendments-for-public-consultation.
[10] “Thailand Ramps up Crackdown on Online Fraud, Targeting Digital Platforms and Consumer Protection.” (2025, July 19). The Nation. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/policy/40052759.
[11] “China, Myanmar, Thailand Reaffirm Commitment to Combat Transnational Telecom Fraud.” (2025, March 3). Xinhua. https://english.news.cn/20250303/097fe97bc8c8400799565ebada41a416/c.html.
[12] “Thailand Sees Notable Decline in Cybercrime Cases after Intensified Crackdown.” (2025, March 18). Xinhua. https://english.news.cn/20250318/b500278a8bdf4415ac01695aded80214/c.html.
[13] The Royal Decree on Measures for Prevention and Suppression of Technology Crimes B.E. 2566 (2023) and the Draft Cyber Security Maintenance Act. (2025, June 4). University of Phayao. https://www.up.ac.th/NewsRead.aspx?itemID=34578.
[14] “Hundreds Of Thousands Trafficked to Work as Online Scammers in SE Asia, Says UN Report.” (2023, August 29). OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/hundreds-thousands-trafficked-work-online-scammers-se-asia-says-un-report.
[15] Duangdee, V. (2025, February 1). “Myanmar Scam Operations Move South along Thai Border.” Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-scam-operations-move-south-along-thai-border/7959295.html.
[16] Beech, H. (2025, February 27). “On a Lawless Tropical Border, the Global Scam Industry Thrives.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/27/world/asia/scam-centers-myanmar-thailand-china.html.
[17] Kelliher, F., & Mureithi, C. (2025, September 9). “‘I Broke Completely’: How Jobseekers from Africa are Being Tricked into Slavery in Asia’s Cyberscam Compounds.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/sep/09/cyberslavery-kenya-uganda-ethiopia-southeast-asia-myanmar-scam-centres.
[18] Loughlin, N. (2024, September 13). “Crime Meets Embedded Corruption in Cambodia.“ Global China Pulse. https://globalchinapulse.net/transnational-crime-meets-embedded-corruption-in-cambodia/.
[19] “Myanmar Junta Set to Axe Police Units Because of Shortage of Officers.” (2022, March 4). The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-set-to-axe-police-units-because-of-shortage-of-officers.html.
[20] “UN Demands Answers from Thailand over Human Trafficking Scams.” (2025, June 23). The Nation. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40051619.
[21] Bryant, M. (2025, June 27). “Denmark to Tackle Deepfakes by Giving People Copyright to their own Features.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/jun/27/deepfakes-denmark-copyright-law-artificial-intelligence.
[22] “New Law Targets Data Thieves.” (2025, April 21). Bangkok Post. https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3007832/new-law-targets-data-thieves.
[23] Yau, J. (2025, March 5). Singapore, EU to Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation for Personal Data Protection.” GovInsider. https://govinsider.asia/intl-en/article/singapore-eu-to-strengthen-bilateral-cooperation-for-personal-data-protection.
[24] “Cambodia Pledges Anti-Scammer Cooperation with Thailand After 10-Hour Talks.” (2025, September 16). Khaosod English. https://www.khaosodenglish.com/news/2025/09/16/cambodia-pledges-anti-scammer-cooperation-with-thailand-after-10-hour-talks/.
[25] “PM to Visit Sa Kaeo to Intensify Crackdown on Poi Pet Online Scams.” (2025, June 25). The Nation. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40051733.
[26] Sims, J. (2025). “Policies and Patterns: State-Abetted Transnational Crime in Cambodia as a Global Security Threat.” Humanity Research Consultancy, p. 38.
[27] Sriyai, S. (2025). “Borderland Scam Centres and Cyber Threats: Policy Considerations for Thailand.” ISEAS Perspective, Vol.60. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/ISEAS_Perspective_2025_60.pdf.
[28] Cogan, M. S. (2024, January 19). “The Self-Defeating Nature of Thailand’s ‘Soft Power’ Push.” The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/the-self-defeating-nature-of-thailands-soft-power-push/.
[29] “Anutin Blames Casino Legalisation Plan for Decline in Chinese Tourist Arrivals.” (2025, July 9). The Nation. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/politics/40052341.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ngamkham, W. (2025, February 11). “‘Tuhao’ Acquitted of Money-Laundering and Drug Charges.” Bangkok Post. https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2958981/tuhao-acquitted-of-money-laundering-and-drug-charges.
[32] “2 Police Generals Transferred for Alleged Links to Grey Businesses in Myanmar.” (2025, February 12). Thai PBS World. https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/2-police-generals-transferred-for-alleged-links-to-grey-businesses-in-myanmar/56503.
[33] Lindenberg, S. (2025, July 7). “Singapore Issues S$27.5m Penalty over Gambling-Linked AML Lapses.” NEXT.Io. https://next.io/news/regulation/singapore-issues-27m-penalty-gambling-aml-lapses/.