The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) consolidated its political dominance in the 23 July 2023 general election, securing 120 of the 125 seats in the National Assembly,[1] a result that underscores one of its strongest holds on power since the adoption of Cambodia’s multi-party democratic framework in 1991. While opposition parties exist in name, they face legal, bureaucratic, and information-based constraints that undermine electoral integrity and limit genuine competition.
Cambodia’s multi-party system was introduced as part of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, which ended the conflict with Vietnam and laid the foundation for a democratic system based on liberal values. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) supervised the country’s first multi-party elections in 1993,[2] marking a new chapter in Cambodia’s political landscape.
Over the past three decades, however, the CPP has weakened the multi-party framework’s integrity, securing an entrenched advantage. In the mid-1990s, electoral violence played a major role in suppressing opposition. As Cambodia entered the 2000s, the CPP shifted towards more institutionalised forms of control, enacting electoral laws that limited opposition activities, using administrative and judicial mechanisms to disqualify competing parties, and enforcing widespread censorship to control the media landscape. By shaping the electoral framework and public discourse, the CPP has consolidated power, reducing the competitive nature of Cambodia’s electoral process.
Electoral Violence in Cambodia
A key feature of Cambodia’s post-1993 elections up until the mid-2000s has been political violence. Often linked to election periods, the targets of CPP’s violence, have been members of opposition parties and their supporters. Although the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) party won the 1993 elections, then-Prime Minister (PM) Hun Sen – who had ruled since 1985 with Vietnam’s backing – refused to step down. This led to a coalition government between the FUNCINPEC and CPP, with Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh serving as co-PM.[3]
The power-sharing arrangement collapsed in 1997 when Hun Sen staged a coup to oust Prince Ranariddh. This resulted in the execution of over 60 opposition members, marking the early consolidation of CPP’s political control. Hun Sen continued as the sole PM.[4] In the lead-up to the 1998 elections, violence against FUNCINPEC members fostered a climate of fear, driving many into exile. Media access for opposition candidates was also restricted, enabling the CPP to campaign with minimal opposition. [5] After its victory, protests over alleged electoral irregularities were met with violent crackdowns and several deaths.[6]
Violence and intimidation persisted ahead of the 2003 elections. Before the 2002 commune elections, seen as a precursor to the general election, 15 opposition activists were killed, and widespread reports emerged of threats and property damage against FUNCINPEC and Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) supporters.[7]
Although sporadic acts of violence persisted – like the assassination of Khim Sambo, a journalist and government critic, in 2008[8] – physical violence against political opposition declined as the democratic system consolidated from the mid-2000s. Overt violence was largely replaced by more insidious forms of intimidation like amending electoral laws to limit opposition activity, using administrative and judicial tactics to marginalise opposition parties, and tightening control over independent media. These tactics further undermined Cambodia’s electoral system while transforming the country into a one-party-dominated state.
Amended Electoral Laws
The electoral legal framework has been systematically amended to tilt the political playing field in favour of CPP, restricting the opportunities for opposition parties to meaningfully participate in elections. The Constitution[9] is the main legal document laying the framework for democracy, with Article 51 stating that the country “adopts a policy of liberal democracy and pluralism”. Therefore, political authority derives from the will of the people, implying the need for free and fair elections to determine the distribution of political power.
However, in the lead-up to the 2023 elections, amendments to the Constitution undermined the role of political opposition. Amendments to Articles 19, 82, 106, 119, 137, and Articles 3 and 4 of the Additional Constitutional Law barred individuals with dual citizenship from holding key positions such as PM.[10] These changes impacted opposition figures of the now-dissolved Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) – who challenged the CPP’s power in the 2013 elections[11] – such as Sam Rainsy, who holds both Cambodian and French citizenship, and Mu Sochua, who is married to a non-Cambodian.
Another example is the Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA)[12] which governs Cambodia’s electoral process. In 2023, amendments introduced restrictions on candidates who had not voted in the last two elections and imposed penalties on those advocating vote boycotts or nullifications.[13] For opposition members in self-imposed exile, leaving Cambodia to avoid politically motivated charges and being unable to vote in past elections, the new rules disqualified them from contesting in future elections, weakening their ability to challenge the CPP’s authority. The amendments were rapidly passed by the National Assembly, and approved by all 111 lawmakers affiliated with CPP with little debate.[14]
Although these examples do not cover all the electoral law amendments, they illustrate a broader strategy of maintaining a legal framework that outwardly preserves legitimacy while restricting eligibility criteria for contesting elections – a process that CPP can enforce with minimal opposition due to its supermajority in parliament.
Administrative and Judicial Tactics
Political violence evolved from the mid-2000s with a range of administrative and judicial tactics used to weaken political opposition, notoriously in the aftermath of the general 2013 elections and the run-up to the 2018 and 2023 general elections.
In the 2013 elections, the CNRP presented the first substantial challenge to the CPP’s political hegemony since 1998. CPP’s vote share dropped to 48.8% and the CNRP secured 44.4% of the votes.[15] Following the close election results, an increase in administrative and judicial tactics to undermine the role of political opposition emerged. In 2015, Sam Rainsy, CNRP’s former President, was sentenced to a two-year prison term on defamation charges after accusing the CPP of voter fraud in 2013.[16] He left the country in November 2015 in self-imposed exile.[17]
The CPP’s efforts to weaken the opposition intensified in 2016 following the assassination of prominent political commentator and government critic Kem Ley. Shortly after his death, Sam Rainsy was charged with defamation for implying government involvement, stating that only the government could carry out such an attack.[18] In February 2017, he stepped down as the CNRP’s President in response to a proposed amendment that would prevent convicted criminals from leading a political party.[19]
In 2017, Kem Sokha, who became CNRP’s President following Sam Rainsy’s resignation, was charged with treason under Article 443 of the Criminal Code. He was accused of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the government,[20] and was later sentenced to 27 years of house arrest and banned from participating in politics. This move was widely regarded by UN experts[21] as politically motivated, and aimed at neutralising the CNRP’s influence. In November 2017, Cambodia’s Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP, accusing it of conspiring to overthrow Hun Sen with foreign backing.[22] In the absence of a strong opposition party, the ruling CPP secured a sweeping victory in the 2018 general election, winning all 125 parliamentary seats with 76.8% of the vote.[23]
In the context of the 2023 elections, the Candlelight Party (CLP) – formerly the Khmer Nation Party and SRP – was disqualified from participating in the 2023 general election after it had become the main opposition party following the dissolution of the CNRP.[24] In the lead-up to the 2023 elections, the National Election Committee (NEC) disqualified the CLP from participating in the elections due to issues with the registration process. The party had submitted photocopied documents instead of the original ones required for registration. CLP contended that all original documents had been confiscated during a police raid in 2017, which hampered their ability to meet the registration requirements.[25] After that, the harassment of its members continued through financial means. In July 2024, CLP’s President Teav Vannol was found guilty of defamation after criticising Prime Minister Hun Manet and was fined USD 1.5 million.[26]
Election manipulation has further disadvantaged the opposition. For instance, in the 2022 commune elections, cases of missing ballots, unexplained additional votes, and frequent corrections and erasures in vote tallies were not unheard of, with little to no action taken by the NEC to prevent this.[27] Collectively, this gives the CPP a significant advantage over its political opponents, weakening the opposition’s ability to compete fairly in elections.
Control of Independent Media
The undermining of multi-party elections has been further intensified by CPP’s tightened control over the independent media, especially after its efforts to consolidate power following the 2013 elections. The CPP government has systematically targeted independent media outlets, journalists and the digital sphere to control narratives on government accountability. This impacts the fairness and competitiveness of elections by restricting the flow of independent information and limiting the opposition’s ability to engage effectively with the public.
In May 2008, Angkor Ratha radio was shut down for airing opposition programmes without government approval.[28] In the year leading up to the 2018 election, the state broadcaster TVK allocated 84% of its airtime to CPP, while FUNCINPEC and SRP received only 10% and 6%, respectively.[29]
In September 2017, The Cambodia Daily – known for its investigative journalism and critical reporting on corruption, human rights abuses and government activities – was forced to shut down after a USD 6.3 million tax demand,[30] believed to be politically motivated given the results of the 2013 elections and timing ahead of the 2018 elections.[31]
The government also targeted Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA), aiming to further tighten up control over independent news sources critical of CPP. Authorities ordered the shutdown of over a dozen radio stations that aired RFA and VOA programming, which significantly limited access to unbiased information, especially in rural areas.[32] RFA ceased in-country operations due to harassment and legal threats but continues reporting from the US, while VOA remains active but with reduced reach.[33]
In February 2023, Voice of Democracy (VOD) was shut down after reporting on a controversial incident involving then PM’s son Hun Manet in the context of the deadly earthquake in Turkey in the same year. The report mentioned that Hun Manet approved a USD 100,000 aid package. Hun Sen claimed that this story was inaccurate and accused VOD of spreading false information that undermined national security.[34]
The National Internet Gateway (NIG), established in Cambodia in 2021, represents a significant tool in the government’s efforts to control and regulate the media environment, though it has not been fully implemented to date. By centralising all internet traffic through a state-controlled gateway, the NIG enables the government to monitor, filter, and restrict access to specific websites,[35] providing a mechanism to limit the reach of independent media and control the dissemination of information. Therefore, its significance lies in its potential to restrict access to content critical of the government, thus consolidating the state’s ability to shape public discourse. This control is especially impactful during politically sensitive periods, such as elections, where the power to influence public opinion and manage media narratives can directly affect electoral outcomes.
Conclusion
Since 1997, Cambodia’s CPP-led government has severely undermined multiparty elections. Initially, this erosion was marked by overt political violence against opposition figures, but it has since shifted to more subtle tactics, including amending electoral laws, harassing political opponents, and exerting strict control over media. As a result, while elections in Cambodia retain an ostensibly multiparty structure, the opposition is systematically denied a genuine chance to compete. This manipulation has allowed the CPP to establish itself as the dominant political force and stifled democratic practices.
The international community has responded with widespread condemnation and calls for accountability, expressing deep concerns about press freedom and the shrinking space for dissent. Efforts have centred on advocacy and supporting civil society initiatives. However, the effectiveness of these efforts remains uncertain, as the CPP continues to resist external pressures to maintain its hold on power.
Marc Piñol Rovira, Asia Centre
NOTES
[1] National Election Committee of Cambodia (NEC) (2023) ‘តារាងលទ្ធផលផ្លូវការនៃការបោះឆ្នោតជ្រើសតាំងតំណាងរាស្ត្រ នីតិកាលទី៧ ឆ្នាំ២០២៣ ថ្ងៃអាទិត្យ ទី២៣ ខែកក្កដា ឆ្នាំ២០២៣ [Official results of the 7th National Assembly Election 2023, Sunday, July 23, 2023]’, NEC, at: https://www.nec.gov.kh/khmer/content/7257.
[2] United States Institute of Peace (2000) ‘Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia’, United States Institute of Peace, at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/final_act_10231991.pdf.
[3] Sorpong Peou (1998) ‘Hun Sen’s Pre-emptive Coup: Causes and Consequences’, Southeast Asian Affairs: 86–102, at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27912198.
[4] Sorpong Peou (1998) ‘Cambodia in 1997: Back to Square One?’, Asian Survey 38(1): 69–74, at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2645469.
[5] Peter M. Manikas and Eric Bjornlund (1998) ‘Cambodia’s 1998 Elections: The Failure of Democratic Consolidation’, New England Journal of Public Policy 14(1): 145–160, at: https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol14/iss1/11.
[6] Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State (1999) ‘Cambodia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998’, US Department of State, at: https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/cambodia.html.
[7] Human Rights Watch (2003) ‘The Run-Up to Cambodia’s 2003 National Assembly Election: Political Expression and Freedom of Assembly under Assault’, Human Rights Watch, at: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/cambodia/cambodia061203.pdf.
[8] Radio Free Asia’s Khmer Service (2008) ‘Khmer Journalist, Son, Shot Dead’, Radio Free Asia, at: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/shooting-07122008181034.html.
[9] “Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 1993” (2008), Constitute Project, at: https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cambodia_2008.
[10] Benjamin Lawrence (2022) ‘Cambodia’s constitutional amendments: Consolidating control and securing succession plans’, ConstitutionNet, at: https://constitutionnet.org/news/cambodias-constitutional-amendments-consolidating-control.
[11] Transparency International Cambodia (2013) Final Election Observation Report on cambodia’s 2013 National Election, Phnom Penh: Transparency International Cambodia, at: https://ticambodia.org/library/wp-content/files_mf/1438020883TICsReporton2013NationalElection.pdf.
[12] “Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly” (1997), NEC, at: https://www.nec.gov.kh/english/sites/default/files/LEMNA.pdf.
[13] “Law on the Amendment of the Election Law” (2023), OpenDevelopment Cambodia, at: https://data.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/laws_record/law-on-the-amendment-of-the-election-law/resource/74985feb-ed3f-475f-b064-bbbf9d9284e5; Ros, Sophea (2023) ‘Cambodia’s amended election law weakens opposition ahead of General Election’, Bower Group Asia, at: https://bowergroupasia.com/cambodias-amended-election-law-weakens-opposition-ahead-of-general-election.
[14] Sopheng Cheang (2023) ‘Cambodian lawmakers approve changes to election law that disqualify candidates who don’t vote’, AP News, at: https://apnews.com/article/cambodia-election-law-amendment-opposition-7c3b279d30dead4520966c64cc9ebbef
[15] NEC (2013) ‘លទ្ធផលនៃការបោះឆ្នោតជ្រើសតាំងតំណាងរាស្ដ្រ នីតិកាលទី៥ ឆ្នាំ២០១៣ (ថ្ងៃទី២៨ ខែកក្កដា ឆ្នាំ២០១៣) [Results of the 5th National Assembly Election 2013 (July 28, 2013)], NEC, at: https://www.nec.gov.kh/khmer/category/317.
[16] Pav Suy (2015) ‘Hun Sen slams Rainsy’s election accusation’, Khmer Times, at: https://www.khmertimeskh.com/58905/hun-sen-slams-rainsys-election-accusation.
[17] BBC News (2015) ‘Sam Rainsy: Wanted Cambodian opposition chief delays return’, BBC News, at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34835121.
[18] BBC News (2016) ‘Cambodian activist Kem Ley shot dead in Phnom Penh’, BBC News, at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36757370.
[19] Sun Narin (2017) ‘Rainsy’s resignation leaves questions lingering over Cambodian politics’, VOA Cambodia, at: https://www.voacambodia.com/a/rainsy-resignation-leaves-questions-lingering-over-cambodian-politics/3721241.html.
[20] Prak Chan Thul (2023) ‘Cambodian opposition figure Kem Sokha sentenced to 27 years of house arrest’, Reuters, at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cambodian-opposition-figure-kem-sokha-sentenced-27-years-treason-2023-03-03.
[21] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2023) ‘Cambodia: UN experts condemn verdict against opposition leader Kem Sokha’, OHCHR, at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/cambodia-un-experts-condemn-verdict-against-opposition-leader-kem-sokha.
[22] BBC News (2017) ‘Cambodia top court dissolves main opposition CNRP party’, BBC News, at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42006828.
[23] NEC (2018) ‘លទ្ធផលផ្លូវការ នៃការបោះឆ្នោតជ្រើសតាំងតំណាងរាស្ត្រ នីតិកាលទី៦ ឆ្នាំ២០១៨(ថ្ងៃទី២៩ ខែកក្កដា ឆ្នាំ២០១៨) [Official results of the 6th National Assembly Election 2018 (July 29, 2018)]’, NEC, at: https://www.nec.gov.kh/khmer/category/186.
[24] AP (2023) ‘Cambodia’s only major opposition party is barred from running in July elections’, The Guardian, at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/16/cambodias-only-major-opposition-party-is-barred-from-running-in-july-elections.
[25] Lors Liblib and Han Noy (2023) ‘Cambodia’s main opposition party disqualified from July’s national election’, VOA News, at: https://www.voacambodia.com/a/cambodia-s-main-opposition-party-disqualified-from-july-s-national-election/7095320.html.
[26] Reuters (2024) ‘Cambodian politician fined $1.5 mln for defamation after democracy criticism’, Reuters, at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cambodian-politician-fined-15-mln-defamation-after-democracy-criticism-2024-07-25.
[27] Andrew Califf and Khuon Narim (2023) ‘“Irregularities” in Commune Election vote tallying raise concerns about national elections, NGO says’, CamboJA News, at: https://cambojanews.com/irregularities-in-commune-election-vote-tallying-raises-concerns-about-national-elections-ngo-says; Elaine Pearson (2024), Letter to the NEC Chairman Regarding Alleged Intimidation and Vote Buying in February 25, 2024 Senate Election, Human Rights Watch, at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/03/letter-nec-chairman-regarding-alleged-intimidation-and-vote-buying-february-25-2024.
[28] Sam Borin, Or Phearith, and Mayarith (2008) ‘Cambodia closes radio station’, Radio Free Asia, at: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/cambodia_media-05302008113811.html.
[29] Hana Krupanská and Marc Livsey (2008) Cambodia National Assemblt Election 27th July 2008: Report on the International Election Observation Mission ANFREL, Bangkok, Thailand: Asian Network for Free Elections, at: https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2008_cambodia.pdf.
[30] Kristi Eaton (2017) ‘The Cambodia Daily newspaper closes over disputed Tax Bill’, NBC News, at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/cambodia-daily-newspaper-closes-over-disputed-tax-bill-n799671.
[31] Aun Chhengpor (2017) ‘Shutdown of prominent Cambodia newspaper fuels fears of government crackdown ahead of elections’, VOA Cambodia, at: https://www.voacambodia.com/a/fearless-newspaper-closure-marks-declaration-of-post-truth-era-in-cambodia/4017429.html.
[32] Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) (2017) ‘Restricting critical voices on Cambodian airwaves’, LICADHO, at: https://www.licadho-cambodia.org/articles/20170909/148/index.html.
[33] Kann Vicheika (2017) ‘Radio Free Asia closes reporting hub, Cambodians miss “critical” coverage”, VOA Cambodia, at: https://www.voacambodia.com/a/radio-free-asia-closes-reporting-hub-cambodians-miss-critical-coverage/4033504.html.
[34] Kelly Ng (2023) ‘Cambodia’s Hun Sen shuts down independent media outlet Voice of Democracy’, BBC News, at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64621595.
[35] Asia Centre (2021) Internet Freedoms in Cambodia: A Gateway to Control, Bangkok, Thailand; Asia Centre and International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, at: https://asiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/Internet-Freedoms-in-Cambodia-A-Gateway-to-Control.pdf.